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Abstract
Professional screeners frequently verify photograph IDs in such industries as professional security, bar tending, and
sales of age-restricted materials. Moreover, security screening is a vital tool for law enforcement in the search for
missing or wanted persons. Nevertheless, previous research demonstrates that novice participants fail to spot fake IDs
when they are rare (i.e., the low prevalence effect; LPE). To address whether this phenomenon also occurs with professional screeners, we conducted three experiments. Experiment 1 compared security professional and non-professionals. Experiment 2 compared bar-security professionals, access-security professionals, and non-professionals. Finally,
Experiment 3 added a newly created Professional Identity Training Questionnaire to determine whether and how
aspects of professionals’ employment predict ID-matching accuracy. Across all three experiments, all participants were
susceptible to the LPE regardless of professional status. Neither length/type of professional experience nor length/
type of training experience affected ID verification performance. We discuss task performance and survey responses
with aims to acknowledge and address this potential problem in real-world screening scenarios.
Keywords: Low prevalence effect, Facial comparison, Facial identification, Professional experience, Facial reviewers
Background
In response to various worldwide security concerns at
borders and other ports of entry, professional screeners commonly restrict access of goods and services to
authorized individuals who present an authentic ID card.
However, a potential traveler may produce stolen, borrowed, or inauthentic documents. Professional screeners
need to maintain safety by identifying such imposters,
while still allowing lawful passengers through. Although
technological advancements such as automatic face recognition systems (e.g., Taigman et al., 2014) and various
methods of biometric scanning may seem like attractive
alternatives to replace human screeners, such technologies face many of the same challenges as human recognizers (O’Toole et al., 2012; e.g., Tran et al., 2017), while
also raising concerns about ethics, transparency, and
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accountability (Drozdowski et al., 2020). Therefore, the
bulk of imposter detection duties has been and is being
performed by humans.
Even under optimal viewing conditions, ID matching
performance has a surprisingly high number of errors
(e.g., Burton, 2013). Errors further increase with additional real-world challenges such as time pressure (e.g.,
Bindemann et al., 2016) and vigilance (e.g., Alenezi
et al., 2015). Among a host of challenges to successful
ID screening, the Low Prevalence Effect (LPE; e.g., Wolfe
et al., 2007) also increases error rates. As a well-known
cognitive phenomenon, the LPE has been demonstrated
for infrequent targets such as objects in a visual array
(e.g., Fleck & Mitroff, 2007), weapons in luggage X-rays
(Wolfe et al., 2013), and most relevant to the current
investigation, fake IDs (Papesh et al., 2018; Papesh
& Goldinger, 2014; Susa et al., 2019; Weatherford &
Schein, 2015; Weatherford et al., 2020; cf. Bindemann
et al., 2016). For instance, Weatherford et al. (2020)
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tested untrained participants’ ability to make identity
judgments about a target face presented beside an ID
card. Fake IDs appeared in either 10%, 50%, or 90% of
all trials. Consistent with the LPE, participants inaccurately accepted more fake IDs (i.e., mismatch errors)
in the 10% prevalence condition. What’s more, performance feedback only exacerbated the effect.
Of theoretical interest, research suggests that the
LPE is caused by early search termination (i.e., making a decision before exhausting all available cues) and/
or criterion shifting (i.e., response criterion, as defined
by signal detection theory, shifts over the course of trials). Although work outside of facial identification has
demonstrated that early search termination might be
corrected by allowing participants time to reconsider
rash decisions (e.g., Fleck & Mitroff, 2007), ID matching tasks have consistently failed to find any evidence
for early search termination (Papesh & Goldinger,
2014; Weatherford et al., 2020). In contrast, facial studies more strongly favor criterion shifting that biases
acceptance of fake IDs as authentic even with additional consideration time, warnings about errors,
bursts of high-prevalence mismatch trials, and other
manipulations designed to combat criterion shifting.
In other words, the LPE is an exceptionally stubborn
source of errors for which we need a greater theoretical
understanding.
Although LPE tasks in the laboratory (e.g., Papesh &
Goldinger, 2014; Weatherford et al., 2020) may be cautiously generalized to other real-world ID matching
tasks, no studies have directly tested if and whether
the LPE emerges in an ID matching task with a professional sample. It is quite possible that this phenomenon
is an artifact of the untrained participants performing
tasks with which they may have little to no experience.
Although it is difficult to estimate exactly how often professionals are presented with fake IDs, security screeners
are likely far more accustomed to seeing an authentic ID
card presented by its rightful owner, and that expectation may influence performance on an ID matching task.
Therefore, the current studies report data from professional samples on an ecologically valid variant of a
routine task for which they have extensive experience.
We hope that results will illuminate if professionals may
commit LPE errors in a facial identification task.

Mapping a laboratory‑based task
onto a professional‑security setting
To increase ecological validity and reduce the influence
of potential confounds associated with laboratory-based
designs, we modeled our ID matching task to reflect
essential aspects of a professional-security setting.
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Realistic document images

During an ID check in the real world, a screener is
responsible for satisfying two goals. One goal involves
authenticating the individual’s documents by visually
scanning for particular security features such as expiration dates, ghost images, and black-light responsive
materials. Many different agencies focus exclusively on
this aspect of the screening process. Continually updated
patents reflect that improvements in this area focus on
combating the passage of fraudulent documents as a
measure to heighten security and stop criminal behavior. The steps needed to complete this goal are relatively
straightforward, and screeners are sometimes provided
with tools (e.g., black-light scanners) to aid detection of
fake IDs. Therefore, we reduced participants’ attention
to this goal by presenting standardized document images
for which security features (e.g., expiration dates, ghost
images) were either removed or held constant to reduce
possible suspicion of fraudulent documents.
A second goal involves authenticating an individuals’ identity by comparing the facial image to the person
presenting it. The steps needed to complete this goal are
far more nebulous—but equally, if not more, important.
A successful screener needs to not only catch fraudulent documents (e.g., presented after printed expiration
date), but also fraudulent identities (i.e., presented by an
imposter). As the more abstract of the two tasks, this second goal of facial image comparison has been the subject
of extensive cognitive investigations to reveal the underlying mechanisms that predict (or fail to predict) success.
Realistic facial images

Research suggests that although humans possess superior
facial recognition skills with familiar faces (e.g., Kramer
et al., 2018; Young & Burton, 2018), this expertise does
not completely extend to unfamiliar faces (Abudarham
et al., 2019; Burton, 2013; Dunn et al., 2018) that would
be typical for a security-screening scenario. Although
both processes share some perceptual characteristics
(e.g., featural analysis, perceptual sensitivity; Abudarham
et al., 2019), many of the hallmarks of familiar face processing revolve around more well-developed conceptual/
associationistic processing that increases the screener’s
ability to generalize from one image of someone to many
others. In other words, facial image comparison only
plays a crucial role when screeners need to authenticate
the documents of unknown individuals.
Many agencies that produce IDs attempt to reduce or
eliminate perceptual variations that impair unfamiliar
face comparison (e.g., Hancock et al., 2000). These variations including suboptimal lighting/shadows (e.g., Braje
et al., 1998), distance (e.g., Lampinen et al., 2014), pose
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(e.g., Hancock et al., 2000), image quality (e.g., Bruce
et al., 2001), and partial face coverage (e.g., Davies & Flin,
1984). Accordingly, all facial images used in this series
of experiments depict a frontal pose of each participant
under adequate lighting without any obstructions (e.g.,
sunglasses, facial scarves). Further, images were of similar size and quality to those used in typical screening
scenarios.
Realistic target comparison images

Even when presented with a facial images are optimized,
the screening task remains challenging because a person
may look markedly different from their own ID photograph. Variability over time (e.g., caused by a change in
hair, weight, or cosmetic alterations) increases withinperson variability. Recently, Weatherford et al. (2020)
investigated the relationship between within-person
variability and the LPE. Over the course of three experiments, the authors replicated the classic LPE, such that
participants in the low mismatch prevalence condition
demonstrated lower mismatch accuracy than those in
medium and high mismatch prevalence conditions. As
the within-person variability in each experiment was
increased through the use of photographs that were captured further apart in time (i.e., from same day images in
Experiment 1 to images taken at least one year apart in
Experiment 3), the LPE only became more pronounced.
Therefore, we removed the possibility that the task would
be trivially simple by using target comparison images/
videos taken in a different context, with a different camera, and that varied in time by at least six months from
the facial image on the document.

How professional screening experiences affect
the LPE
After establishing ecologically valid measures, the current study extends beyond student samples reported
in previous studies (Papesh et al., 2018; e.g., Papesh &
Goldinger, 2014; Susa et al., 2019; Weatherford et al.,
2020) by recruiting ID screening professionals. Aside
from training, which has shown mixed results in improving ID screening accuracy (e.g., Towler et al., 2014, 2019),
professionals’ routine experience with ID screening may
affect ID matching accuracy. As no published work has
examined the relationship between professional experience and the LPE, two theoretically supported, yet divergent, possibilities may predict facial image comparison
performance.
Professional experience might reduce LPE errors

In a practical sense, the best-case scenario would involve
professional improvements in facial comparison performance alongside reductions in mismatch LPE errors.
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If experience promotes expertise, then a wide variety of security professionals should outperform naive,
untrained participants on both the task itself (i.e., overall
accuracy), and the detection of fake IDs (i.e., mismatch
error rate). In the present studies, we focused on facial
reviewers (i.e., individuals who perform a high volume of
routine facial comparison tasks within a relatively short
period of time throughout their entire shift; see also
FISWG, 2011), as these professionals perform the bulk
of identification matching operations designed to ensure
public safety. Occupations such as police officers, security guards, border patrol agents, and the like would fit
within this category.
Concerning overall accuracy, some studies have demonstrated that professional experience improves matching performance (i.e., overall performance on match and
mismatch trials). These studies typically appeal to benefits by way of quantitative (e.g., years of employment) and
qualitative (e.g., type and amount of identity comparisons made across a variety of contexts) aspects of professional experience. One illustrative example of improved
performance involved the comparison of passport issuance officers to novices in a photograph-to- photographID matching task. Using a relatively large sample size
(n = 204), Towler et al. (2019; Experiment 2) found that
professionals outperformed novices on a photographto-photograph task using unfamiliar faces, with benefits
modestly increasing in line with the difficulty of the tasks.
Similar findings using other photograph-to-photograph
comparisons have also been observed (e.g., Phillips et al.,
2018).
Professional experience might not affect, or might
exacerbate, LPE errors

While the best-case scenario is attractive, the larger body
of evidence supports the possibility of a non-significant
finding. More specifically, several studies assessing facial
reviewers’ skills (e.g., White et al., 2014; Papesh et al.,
2018Heyer et al., 2018; Wirth & Carbon, 2017) were not
as successful. Professional experience did not improve
task performance. If the current studies fit within this
body of work, then we might predict no benefit of professional experience.
One last theoretical possibility is that professional experience will exacerbate LPE errors. In the field, it is reasonable to expect that professionals see a low prevalence of
fake IDs. This low prevalence likely shifts their criterion,
thereby tempting a screener to misattribute a high variability between and ID and its presenter as within-person
variability (i.e., the differences seen between two images
of the same person) instead of between-person variability
(i.e., the similarities seen between two images of different
people). In other words, when individuals seeking access
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to restricted goods and services present an ID with large
differences (e.g., glasses, aging effects, cosmetics), the
most practical approach would be to assume that variability is a natural by-product of comparing an individual to an image from up to ten years ago. If fraudulent
documents and identities are rare, this heuristic would
serve to reduce false alarms (i.e., rejecting an authentic
ID). To the extent that professional experience transfers
to other identity matching tasks, and those heuristics and
assumptions remain intact, then professionals may actually commit more LPE errors than untrained novices.
Given that several studies have found criterion shifting
even within a short experimental period (e.g., Papesh
et al., 2018; Susa et al., 2019; Weatherford et al., 2020),
it is entirely reasonable that routine, professional experiences could negatively transfer to this new task.

The current studies
In three studies, we manipulated the ratio of fake to
authentic IDs across participants and expected to replicate previous findings with our non-professional participants. In the low mismatch condition (i.e., 90% matches
to 10% mismatches), we predicted that non-professionals
would identify fake IDs less often. Likewise in the low
match condition (i.e., 10% matches to 90% mismatches),
we predicted that non-professionals would identify
authentic IDs less often. We expected that these differences, compared to a balanced condition (50% matches
to 50% mismatches), would be largely driven by criterion
shifting. In other words, participants in the imbalanced
conditions would either relax their criteria for a “match”
decision under the low mismatch prevalence or constrain
their criteria for a “match” decision under low match
conditions.
To foreshadow our findings, all of our predictions were
confirmed for non-professionals. Furthermore, despite
possible differences to task performance that might be
expected with professional security experience, professional status did not affect our pattern of results. Participants in both types of imbalanced groups (low mismatch
and low match) produced the typical pattern of the LPE.
Even though feedback may have heightened awareness of
the imbalanced base rates (a point we revisit in the General Discussion), the data consistently support no differences in ID verification performance across professional
status, type of security occupation, and self-reports of
previous employment and training histories.
Experiment 1
Method
Participants

Recruitment All participants were recruited through a
university subject pool or a Qualtrics panel (www.Qualt
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rics.com). Qualtrics recruiting ensured that participants’
self-reported age, gender, race/ethnicity, and income generally reflected established patterns reported in the 2010
US Census. For specific qualifications, such as professional security experience, Qualtrics panels use targeted
marketing to attract participants from specific partners
with whom they establish relationships and subsequently
confirm the availability of participants with the requisite
qualifications for inclusion. Understandably, many of the
professionals might have been hesitant to provide the
name of their employer. And, to protect their identities
under such circumstances as to encourage their honest
responding, we did not solicit that specific information.
Sample The sample consisted of N = 78 individuals. Non-professionals (N = 54; Mage = 37.22 years,
SD = 14.53; 4 failed to report; 38 females) participated in
exchange for partial course credit or $6.00 (all compensation rates reported in USD),1 depending upon recruiting source. Professionals (N = 24; Mage = 48.3 years,
SD = 13.79; 4 failed to report; 7 females) reported at least
1 year of professional ID card screening experience and
participated in exchange for between $20 and $30. Both
groups represented a diverse sample of participants
(59.0% White/Caucasian, 26.9% Hispanic/Latinx, 11.5%
Black/African-American, 0% Asian/Pacific Islander, and
2.6% other).2
Power analysis

In order to determine the appropriate sample size for
our design, we referred to the documented effect sizes
in Weatherford et al. (2020). To capture the interactive
effect of mismatch prevalence and feedback, we used
effect sizes from Experiment 2, which used the same
stimuli as we adopted here: η2 p = 0.16 (with subsequent
interpretation of values above 0.25 being large, 0.09 being
medium, and 0.01 being small) which converts to f = 0.44
(with 0.40 considered large, 0.25 considered medium, and
0.10 considered small; Cohen, 1988). We conducted an a
priori power analysis in G*Power (Faul et al., 2007) using
the statistical test for “ANOVA: Fixed effects, special,
main effects and interactions” using desired power (1 −
β probability) of 0.90 and a numerator df of 2. G*Power

1

Our disparate compensation rates throughout all three experiments represent an increased incentive for our professional samples, which might have
otherwise been more challenging to recruit. Increased compensation is standard practice across many fields who recruit professionals, and we do not see
any evidence to suggest that it altered participants’ patterns of responding.
2

We recruited our sample to approximate the racial/ethnic and gender
demographics of the 2010 US Census. Participants were randomly assigned
to conditions such that aggregate values across all conditions mirror demographic characteristics within conditions.
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Fig. 1 Example stimuli of identities used in experiment 1 (top row) and experiments 2 and 3 (bottom row). Experiment 1 presented a still target
image compared to a state-based photograph ID. Experiments 2 and 3 presented a moving target video compared to a US passport. The left
column represents match pairs, whereas the right column represents mismatch pairs. All images used with permission

indicated a required sample size of n = 70. Thus, our sample size of n = 78 exceeded the sample size necessary to
achieve sufficient power.
Materials

Identity matching task Participants viewed 200 unique
images of 100 identities from a facial database (Weatherford et al., 2016) that approximated the same racial/ethnic
and gender composition as the 2010 US Census. Each trial
displayed a static target image (296 × 296 pixels) beside
another static image embedded in one of six state ID
templates (200 × 120 pixels) on a black background (see
Fig. 1). All static images were taken in a controlled environment. The target image was taken in front of a blue
background, and the state ID image was taken in front of
a white background. The two images were taken with different cameras, in different settings, between six months
to five years apart.
All image pairs were the same as described in Weatherford et al. (2020), Experiment 2. Among 100 identity

pairs, we randomly chose 10 to serve as low-prevalence
targets for the imbalanced conditions (i.e., presented as
mismatches for the low mismatch prevalence condition
or matches for the low match prevalence condition). For
the balanced prevalence condition, we randomly split
the 100 pairs across two different versions (i.e., the 50
identity pairs that served as mismatches in one counterbalance variation were displayed as matches in the
other counterbalance variation). All identities were fully
counterbalanced across all conditions, such that no participant viewed the same image more than once (for
complete counterbalancing legends, see OSF website
listed below).
Design and procedure

All participants accessed the ID matching task and
provided informed consent online through Qualtrics. Participants were randomly assigned to one of
three prevalence conditions (low mismatch/10% mismatches; balanced/50% mismatches; or low match/90%
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mismatches) and three feedback conditions (full feedback, error-only feedback, or no feedback). On each of
the 100 trials, participants responded to the question
“Are these photographs of the same person?” on a 1–6
scale, with 1 indicating Definitely No and 6 indicating
Definitely Yes. After making the decision, participants
in the full feedback condition saw one of four feedback
statements. After a correct decision, they viewed “You
rejected a fake ID” for mismatch trials or “You accepted
an authentic ID” for match trials. After an incorrect decision, they viewed “You accepted a fake ID” for mismatch
trials or “You rejected an authentic ID” for match trials.
Participants in the error-only feedback condition only
received the feedback statements after incorrect decisions. Participants in the no feedback condition did not
see any statements about their performance. After 100
trials, participants provided demographic information,
were debriefed, and thanked for their time.

Results
Our first experiment supports the conclusion that professionals exhibit the LPE, following the same patterns
as non-professionals, regardless of what type of trial is
infrequent. In other words, when fake IDs were infrequent—mismatch errors rose. When authentic IDs were
infrequent—match errors rose. Further, the data support
a criterion shift explanation, as evidenced in Fig. 2 (see
also, Weatherford et al. 2020).
Analysis of discriminability and response criterion

We first binarized our data into match/mismatch decisions by collapsing across the 1–6 options (see Stanislaw
& Todorov for comparisons of rating tasks with yes/
no tasks3). We coded yes responses (i.e., Definitely Yes,
Probably Yes, and Maybe Yes) to the question, “Are these
photographs of the same person?” as match decisions.
We coded no responses (i.e., Definitely no, Probably
No, and Maybe No) as mismatch decisions. Therefore,
correct responses to match and mismatch trials were
coded as hits and correct rejections, respectively. Incorrect responses to match and mismatch trials were coded
as misses and false alarms, respectively (although see
Papesh, 2014, for an alternative coding approach that
treats successful identification of mismatches as “hits”).
To account for extreme performance levels (e.g., hit or

3

For a more nuanced treatment of the data that does not collapse across
degrees of certainty reflected in participants’ interpretation of differences
between Definitely, Probably, and Maybe, we also created receiver operating characteristics (ROC) curves. This approach allowed us to compare partial area under the curve (pAUC) between conditions. The overall pattern of
results was similar to the signal detection measures reported above. Therefore, we direct the interested reader to our Additional file 1 for the analysis
and report of those data.
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false alarm rates of zero), extreme values were replaced
by 1–2/N for rates of 1 or 2/N of 0, where N represents
the number of trials of that type. For ease of comparison, the complementary error rates for misses and false
alarms are depicted in Fig. 2.
We further went on to analyze signal detection measures of discriminability (d′) and response criterion (C).
For d′, higher values are interpreted as a greater ability
to distinguish between match and mismatch trials. For C,
a value of zero represents no bias toward either match or
mismatch decisions. However, lower or negative C values
are interpreted as a greater likelihood of making a match
decision. In contrast, higher C values are interpreted as a
greater likelihood of making a mismatch decision.
We conducted a 3 (Prevalence: Low Mismatch, Balanced, Low Match) × 3 (Feedback: None, Error, Full) × 2
(Group: Professional, Non-Professional) factorial analysis of variance on discriminability measure d’. As can be
seen in Fig. 2, the ANOVA revealed that only Prevalence
significantly affected discriminability, F(2, 58) = 5.61,
p = 0.006, n2p = 0.160. Tukey’s Bonferroni-corrected
HSD found that Balanced prevalence yielded greater discriminability than Low Match prevalence (p = 0.02) and
Low Mismatch prevalence (p = 0.003), which were not
significantly different from one another. No other factors
yielded significant main effects or interactions.
We next conducted a 3 (Prevalence: Low Mismatch,
Balanced, Low Match) × 3 (Feedback: None, Error,
Full) × 2 (Group: Professional, Non-Professional) factorial analysis of variance on response criterion measure
C. As predicted, Prevalence significantly affected criterion, F(2, 58) = 14.78, p < 0.001, n2p = 0.334. Tukey’s Bonferroni-corrected HSD found that criterion under Low
Match prevalence was significantly higher than Balanced
(p < 0.001) and Low Mismatch prevalence (p < 0.001),
which were not significantly different from one another.
Criterion for professionals was marginally higher than
non-professionals, F (1, 58) = 2.91, p = 0.09. These effects
were accompanied by a significant Prevalence x Feedback interaction, F(4, 58) = 4.63, p = 0.003, n2p = 0.239.
Planned follow-up comparisons found this interaction
was driven by significant univariate effects of Feedback
at Low Mismatch prevalence [F(2, 59) = 5.47, p = 0.007,
n2p = 0.157], but not other levels of prevalence.

Discussion
Although these initial results seem promising, we sought
to replicate and extend them to a modified paradigm
with more externally valid materials. We also differentiated between different types of professional groups, as
opposed to simply treating all professional experiences
similarly.
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Fig. 2 Average non-professional (left column) and professional (right column) match error rate, mismatch error rate, discriminability, and response
criterion at each level of prevalence collapsed across feedback conditions from experiment 1. Error bars represent standard error of the mean (SE)

Regarding the paradigm modifications, Experiments 2
and 3 were altered by replacing a) the static target image
with a video of a person in a frontal pose rotating their
head from side to side, and b) the state-based driver

license templates with US passports. First, we justified
the choice to incorporate video targets by relying upon
previous research comparing still to moving images (e.g.,
Pike et al., 1997; Zhao & Bülthoff, 2017). Videos create
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a richer encoding experience that allows a screener to
consider additional cues that are unavailable in a static
image. These additional cues might then become diagnostic evidence to support a more informed match or
mismatch decision (e.g., Pilz et al., 2006). At a theoretical level, the extant literature in facial identification and
recognition supports both qualitative and quantitative
differences that confer advantages in processing for moving versus still images (Lander et al., 1999; O’Toole et al.,
2002; Thornton & Kourtzi, 2002; Yovel & O’Toole, 2016).
Secondly, we justified the switch to US passports to
reduce additional attentional demands and perceived
salience brought about by an inconsistent ID template.
Using a standardized ID template with blurred typeface implicitly encourages participants to ignore any
irrelevant details (e.g., expiration date, name, birthdate;
see Goal 1 of document authentication as described in
Introduction) and instead devote attention to facial comparison (e.g., comparisons of target video and ID image;
see Goal 2 of identity authentication as described in
Introduction).
Our choice to diversify our professional pool was similarly motivated by both theoretical and applied rationales. At a theoretical level, we anticipated that different
types of professional experience would involve a different
quantity of experiences with fake identification cards. In
line with logic laid out in Papesh and Goldinger (2014),
we anticipated that bar door security professionals would
likely encounter a higher percentage of fake IDs (in terms
of both fraudulent documents and/or fraudulent identities) than access security professionals. If fake IDs are
more prevalent in their occupational experiences, bar
door security may be less susceptible to mismatch LPE
errors. At an applied level, we also anticipated that different types of professional experience would also involve a
different quality of experiences with identification checking more generally. Although much more challenging to
typify, we anticipated these two types of professionals
complete their identification checking tasks in, perhaps,
meaningfully different ways.

Experiment 2
Experiment 2 compared performance of non-professionals, bar door security professionals, and access security
professionals on 100 identification trials between a target
video and a US passport. We predicted that if the relative
percentage of fraudulent ID cards in their professional
experience conferred an advantage, then bar door security professionals (but not non-professionals or access
security professionals) would commit fewer mismatch
LPE errors. However, if these professional experiences
did not transfer to this identification task, then we would
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predict no significant differences between professionals
of either type and non-professionals.
Method
Participants

All N = 714 participants were recruited through a Qualtrics panel (www.Qualtrics.com). Non-Professionals
(N = 441; Mage = 45.13 years, SD = 11.39; 42 chose not
to answer; 282 females) participated in exchange for
$6. Professionals were further divided into two groups.
Bar security (i.e., panel respondents who self-reported
as being currently employed as a bouncer or bartender,
responsible for checking IDs as a routine part of their
daily duties, with at least one year of professional experience; N = 138; Mage = 37.18 years, SD = 10.29; 14 chose
not to answer; 75 females) participated in exchange for
$20. Access security (i.e., panel respondents who selfreported as being currently employed as a border patrol
officer, transportation security officer, police officer,
or security guard, responsible for checking IDs a routine part of their daily duties, with at least one year of
professional experience; N = 135; Mage = 40.96 years,
SD = 10.33; 15 chose not to answer; 56 females) participated in exchange for $30. All groups represented a
diverse sample of participants (75.1% White/Caucasian,
4.5% Hispanic/Latinx, 9.1% Black/African-American,
4.8% Asian/Pacific Islander, 4.8% Multiracial, and 1.1%
other; 4 participants chose not to answer).
Qualtrics panels operate online, and therefore we
wanted to be assured that participant data were not contaminated by error variance not associated with the task
at hand. Subsequently, n = 10 participants were excluded
for failing to comply with instructions (e.g., answering
“yes” on all image pairs, taking hours to complete a single trial). Therefore, the final sample included n = 704
participants.
Power analysis

Our decision to substantially increase our sample size,
despite previous power analyses that suggested a smaller
minimum n, was primarily guided by two factors. First,
we acknowledged that several studies in the literature
(e.g., White et al., 2014) have found no demonstrable
difference between professionals and non-professionals
on face matching tasks. However, many studies have
adopted very conservative approaches to the minimum
necessary sample size to capture the effect. As such, we
wanted to err on the side of caution. Second, this video
task combined with a new type of feedback (described
in Methods below) is a newly adopted paradigm that has
not been previously tested on any samples—students,
professionals, or otherwise. Therefore, we wanted a large
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enough sample to capture any differing effects of this format, supposing that those effects exist.
We used G*Power (Faul et al., 2007) to perform an a
priori power analysis for “ANOVA: Fixed effect, special,
main effects and interactions” using a medium effect size
η2 p = 0.09, which equates to f = 0.314. With power set to
0.90 and a numerator df of 2, the calculations suggested
a minimum sample size of n = 132. With this value in
mind, each group (i.e., non-professional, bar security, and
access security) meet this minimum threshold to reveal
an effect if it exists.
Materials

Identity matching task Participants viewed the same
100 identities from Experiment 1. We replaced the static
image with a moving target video presented beside a static
image embedded in a US passport template with Adobe
Photoshop on a black background (see Fig. 1). All videos
and images were taken in a controlled environment. The
target video was taken in front of a blue background in
which the person turned their head from side to side for
between 10 and 14 s. The video played continuously in a
looping fashion until the participant made a decision. The
US passport ID image was taken in front of a white background, and the passport template remained unchanged
from trial to trial. The video and image were taken with
different cameras, in different settings, between six
months to five years apart.
Design and procedure

As in Experiment 1, all participants accessed the ID
matching task and provided informed consent online
through Qualtrics. All procedures were identical to
Experiment 1, except that we replaced error-only feedback with visual repeat feedback (justified and more
elaborately discussed in Experiment 2 Discussion). After
making each decision, participants in the visual repeat
feedback condition reviewed the trial and were asked to
consider the similarities (on match trials) or differences
(on mismatch trials) between the target identity and ID
card identity before advancing to the next trial.

Results
Replicating the pattern of results from Experiment 1, we
found no reliable differences between professionals and
non-professionals: Both groups exhibited the LPE as evidenced by differences in discriminability and criterion in
the low prevalence conditions.
Analysis of discriminability and response criterion

As with Experiment 1, we again began with calculating and depicting match and mismatch error rates (see
Fig. 3). Afterward, we conducted a 3 (Prevalence: Low
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Mismatch, Balanced, Low Match) × 3 (Feedback: None,
Visual Repeat, Full) × 3 (Group: Non-Professionals, Bar
Security, Access Security) factorial analysis of variance
on discriminability measure d’. As with Experiment 1, the
factor of note is Prevalence, which significantly affected
discriminability, F(2, 680) = 25.07, p < 0.001, n2p = 0.069.
Tukey’s Bonferroni-corrected HSD found that Balanced
prevalence yielded greater discriminability than Low
Match prevalence (p < 0.001) and Low Mismatch prevalence (p < 0.001), which were not significantly different
from one another. Feedback also affected discriminability,
F(2, 680) = 3.89, p = 0.02, n2p = 0.011, although Tukey’s
HSD comparisons found no differences between individual Feedback conditions. Finally, Group also affected
discriminability, F(2, 680) = 3.19, p = 0.04, n2p = 0.009,
although Tukey’s HSD comparisons found no differences
between individual levels of the Group factor. There were
no significant interactions among these factors.
We next conducted a 3 (Prevalence: Low Mismatch,
Balanced, Low Match) × 3 (Feedback: None, Visual
Repeat, Full) × 3 (Group: Non-Professionals, Bar Security, or Access Security) factorial analysis of variance on
response criterion measure C. As can be seen in Fig. 3,
criterion shifted primarily due to Prevalence and Feedback independently as well as through the interaction of
these two factors. Prevalence significantly affected criterion, F(2, 680) = 140.46, p < 0.001, n2p = 0.292. Tukey’s
Bonferroni-corrected HSD tests found significant differences among all three prevalence conditions (p’s < 0.001).
Low Match prevalence yielded the highest criterion followed by Balanced prevalence and Low Mismatch prevalence. Feedback also significantly affected criterion, F(2,
680) = 5.18, p = 0.006, n2p = 0.015. Tukey’s HSD tests
found that No Feedback yielded a significantly lower criterion than Full or Visual Repeat Feedback (p’s < 0.002),
but the latter were not different from one another at the
adjusted alpha level. These effects were accompanied
by a significant Prevalence × Feedback interaction, F(4,
680) = 23.89, p < 0.001, n2p = 0.123. Planned follow-up
comparisons found this interaction was driven by significant univariate effects of Feedback at Low Mismatch
[F(2, 680) = 17.19, p < 0.001, n2p = 0.048], Balanced [F(2,
680) = 4.83, p = 0.008, n2p = 0.014] and Low Match
[F(2, 680) = 32.51, p < 0.001, n2p = 0.087] prevalence
conditions.

Discussion
Despite the intuition that different types of professional
experiences may improve detection of fake IDs, our
results fail to support that position. On the contrary,
we found that all three groups (non-professionals, bar
security professionals, and access security professionals) largely followed the same patterns. Again, general
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Fig. 3 Average non-professional (left column) and professional (right column) match error rate, mismatch error rate, discriminability, and response
criterion at each level of prevalence and feedback from experiment 2. Error bars represent standard error of the mean (SE)

cognitive mechanisms that predict the LPE more adequately explained our data than alternatives that assume
different degrees of expertise as a function of different

professional roles. Of rather small consolation, the only
difference that emerged between professional groups
was in response to visual repeat feedback. Whereas the
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low mismatch prevalence bar security professionals performed significantly worse than non-professionals on the
visual repeat feedback, access security professionals did
not.
In a sense, the visual feedback condition might be
argued to provide both feedback (by way of confirming
or disconfirming the participant’s decision) and attentional training (by cuing attention to either similarities or
differences after a participant’s decision; see also Papesh
et al. 2018 for a similar “burst” approach for attentional
reorientation). Emerging evidence in sustained attention
(Rothlein et al., 2018) suggests that task-relevant goals
extracted from the context (in this case, prevalence rates)
may promote the formation of attentional templates to
optimize task performance. In response, participants rely
upon these templates to reduce the reaction time necessary to make correct decisions. When the base rate for
matches and mismatches is equivalent, as would be the
case in the balanced prevalence conditions, then biasing the attentional template toward either similarities or
differences would not be advantageous. However, when
base rates are imbalanced, then biasing the attentional
template be beneficial (see also goal hierarchy; Kluger &
DeNisi, 1996). This benefit, though, would be theoretically symmetrical—visual repeating should affect both
low match and low mismatch prevalence. Given that our
data do not support this theoretical position, we are hesitant to draw any firm conclusions without replication. As
a result, we reserve a full conversation of these findings
for the General Discussion.
Turning to our third and final experiment, we sought
to replicate the LPE findings and more closely examine
professional experience. We again adopted the coarsegrained categorical classification (as authenticated by
Qualtrics panels) of non-professionals, bar security professionals, and access security professionals. However, we
also included an additional Professional Identity Training
Questionnaire (PITQ, details in Experiment 3 Methods
section; see also, Appendix) following the identification
task. This questionnaire allowed us to characterize security professionals beyond a simple job title and occupational category.
The PITQ includes questions about four major aspects
of professional experience (1) quantity of identification matching experience (e.g., years in occupation, shift
length, percentage of shift devoted to task), (2) quality
of identification matching experience (e.g., use of digital aids, types of image or video comparisons), (3) identification matching training experience (e.g., length,
description, practice sessions, feedback), and (4) attitudes
toward training and feedback (e.g., viewed as beneficial,
other qualitative details). We reasoned that this information would be informative at a descriptive level (i.e.,
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fill gaps in general knowledge about these facets of job
experience) and at an inferential level (i.e., test whether
professional experience predicts identification-matching
performance).
As discussed in Introduction, one of the major goals
of both professional experience and training is to render
unfamiliar face matching (with which we do not all have
expertise; cf. super-recognizers; Ramon et al., 2019a,
2019b) less error-prone by making it more similar to
familiar face matching. However, empirical support is
mixed. Nevertheless, if positions are to be made that professionals should gain expertise through years of experience and training, we reasoned that both should manifest
in the form of a positive relationship with match hits and
a negative relationship with mismatch false alarms.
In order for years of experience to improve screeners’ ability to recognize fraudulent identities, and not
just fraudulent documents, government agencies (e.g.,
Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs,
2020; U.S. Department of State, 2020) have outlined criteria to lessen the deleterious effects of facial variation.
For example, US Passport facial photographs must meet
criteria regarding sufficiently high resolution and size,
standard backgrounds and lighting, front-facing pose
with squared shoulders, and no accessories that might
obscure parts of the face (e.g., hats, eyeglasses). This
standardization serves both goals of authenticating the
document itself (such that unacceptable photographic
variations indicate a possibly fraudulent document) and
authenticating the person presenting it (such that differences between the photograph and the person are
reduced). In line with the differing complexity of the two
goals of identity screening, the standardized elements of
an authentic ID are concrete. Documents either do or do
not possess the security features. Facial comparison is
more abstract; the same facial features can support both
match and mismatch decisions across screeners. Therefore, many screeners may only improve their ability to
detect fraudulent documents via professional experience,
without appropriately considering and improving facial
image comparison.
If a professional is trained, that training should include
practice and feedback about performance on identifying both fraudulent documents and fraudulent identities.
This type of training has been implicated as the mechanism by which facial examiners (i.e., a separate class of
facial comparison professionals who have demonstrated
expertise as a function of mentorship and a focus on
exhaustive deliberation) show improved performance
compared to novices (Phillips et al., 2018; Towler et al.,
2017; White et al., 2015). Information about which types
of professionals complete training, and how often, is limited and/or kept intentionally private.
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Recent literature, on the other hand, shows that training sessions for facial reviewers are typically relatively
short courses (i.e., ranging from 1 h to 5 days) that customarily include description of the standard elements of
the ID document, a brief introduction to facial anatomy,
and identity screening exercises (e.g., Towler et al., 2019).
Unfortunately, the vast majority of training regimens
are not research-informed. To improve the detection
of fraudulent identities, research suggests that training
exercises should include a variety of facial images (e.g.,
Gentry & Bindemann, 2019) that deviate from the standardized documents used for ID cards. This image variety
should represent sufficient within-person variability, representing differences in images of the same person, and
between-person variability, representing differences in
images of two different people. Training should promote
high identity-screening accuracy, even when either (a) an
individual’s visual appearance changes drastically (e.g.,
weight loss/gain, natural aging, cosmetic alterations)
from their ID facial image over time (Burton, 2013; Burton et al., 2016; Menon et al., 2015b) or (b) an ID facial
image looks just as similar to its owner as an imposter.

Experiment 3
To test the possible influence of professional experiences,
Experiment 3 examined the degree to which responses to
survey items predicted (or failed to predit) facial image
comparison accuracy.
Method
Participants

All N = 1474 participants (none of whom participated in any of the previous experiments) were
recruited through a Qualtrics panel (www.Qualtrics.
com) using the same compensation rates and criteria as Experiment 2. The sample represented non-professionals (N = 949;Mage = 49.07 years, SD = 14.81;
1 chose not to answer; 625 females), bar security
(N = 208; Mage = 36.95 years, SD = 10.23; 4 chose not
to answer; 94 females), and access security (N = 317;
Mage = 41.67 years, SD = 11.50; 122 females). All groups
represented a diverse sample of participants (76.6%
White/Caucasian, 8.6% Black/African-American, 4.0%
Hispanic/Latinx, 4.3% Asian/Pacific Islander, 4.3% Multiracial, and 1.3% other; 8 participants chose not to
answer). Twelve participants were excluded from analysis for the same types of instructional compliance violations as described in Experiment 2. The final sample of
N = 1462 was subjected to data analysis.
Power analysis

Again, we selected our appropriate sample size based on
an a priori power analysis. As this final experiment aimed
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to reveal differences between two types of professional
experience, and included non-professional members
for comparison, we again saw reason to be conservative
in our sampling approach. We supposed that the effect
may be only small to medium between these two professional groups. Using a n2p of 0.05 and corresponding
f = 0.23, we used G*Power (Faul et al., 2007) to calculate
the minimum sample size to reveal an effect with power
set to 0.90 and numerator df set to 1. Output parameters
revealed a minimum sample size of n = 202. As our smallest professional group size was n = 208, all three samples
were sufficiently large to reveal an effect if it exists.
Materials

Identity matching task Experiment 3 used the same
identities and materials as Experiment 2.
Professional identity training questionnaire (PITQ) The
34-item survey (see Appendix) contained 4 sections: (1)
professional background, (2) professional experience,
(3) professional training, and (4) attitudes toward training. The survey included a mix of close-ended and openended questions using a response-contingent presentation sequence.
Design and procedure

As in Experiments 1 and 2, all participants accessed the
survey and provided informed consent online through
Qualtrics. All procedures were identical to Experiment 2, except we replaced visual repeat feedback with
guided visual feedback. After making an incorrect decision, participants in the guided visual feedback condition
reviewed the trial and were asked to consider the similarities (on match trials) or differences (on mismatch trials)
between the target identity and ID card identity before
advancing to the next trial. Unlike the visual repeat condition from Experiment 2, visually guided feedback participants would automatically advance to the next trial
if they made correct identity decision. Upon completion
of the 100 trials, participants then completed the PITQ,
provided demographic information, were debriefed, and
thanked for their time.

Results
As in Experiments 1 and 2, professionals and non-professionals both exhibited the LPE demonstrated by differences in discriminability and criterion when mismatch
trials were rare. The addition of the Professional Identity
Training Questionnaire revealed preliminary evidence
that professionals’ false alarm rates (i.e., tendency to
respond “match” to mismatch trials) are driven up among
those who normally use normally additional technological aids when making ID verification during their work.
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Analysis of discriminability and response criterion

As with Experiments 1 and 2, we again began by calculating match and mismatch error rates (see Fig. 3). Afterward, we conducted a 3 (Prevalence: Low Mismatch,
Balanced, Low Match) × 3 (Feedback: None, Visually
Guided, Full) × 3 (Group: Non-Professional, Bar Security, Access Security) factorial analysis of variance on
discriminability measure d’. As can be seen in Fig. 4, only
Prevalence significantly affected discriminability, F(2,
1425) = 9.14, p < 0.001, n2p = 0.013. Tukey’s Bonferronicorrected HSD found that Low Mismatch prevalence
yielded poorer discriminability than Balanced (p < 0.001)
and Low Match prevalence (p < 0.02), which were not significantly different from one another. No other factors
yielded significant main effects or interactions.
We next conducted a 3 (Prevalence: Low Mismatch,
Balanced, Low Match) × 3 (Feedback: None, Visually
Guided, Full) × 3 (Group: Non-Professional, Bar Security, Access Security) factorial analysis of variance on
response criterion measure C. As can be seen in Fig. 4,
criterion shifted primarily due to Prevalence and Feedback independently as well as through the interaction
of these two factors. Prevalence significantly affected
criterion, F(2, 1425) = 169.03, p < 0.001, n2p = 0.192.
Tukey’s Bonferroni-corrected HSD found that Low Mismatch prevalence yielded a lower criterion than Balanced
(p < 0.001) and Low Match prevalence (p < 0.001). In
turn, Balanced prevalence yielded a lower criterion than
Low Match prevalence (p < 0.001). Feedback also significantly affected criterion, F (2, 1425) = 19.62, p < 0.001,
n2p = 0.027. Tukey’s HSD tests found that No Feedback
yielded a significantly lower criterion than Full or Visually
Guided Feedback (p’s < 0.001), but the latter were not different from one another at the adjusted alpha level. These
effects were accompanied by a significant Prevalence
x Feedback interaction, F(4, 1425) = 67.91, p < 0.001,
n2p = 0.160. Planned follow-up comparisons found this
interaction was driven by significant univariate effects of
Feedback at Low Mismatch [F(2, 1425) = 33.11, p < 0.001,
n2p = 0.044], Balanced [F(2, 1425) = 6.46, p = 0.002,
n2p = 0.009] and Low Match [F(2, 1425) = 116.57,
p < 0.001, n n2p = 0.141] prevalence conditions.
Regression analyses on survey responses

One of the major goals of Experiment 3 was to determine whether aspects of professionals’ employment and
personal histories predicted success at the ID screening
task (see descriptive statistics, see Table 1). We carried
out regression analyses on hits and false alarms between
bar security and access security professionals. The four
predictors entered into the models were number of days
of pre-employment training, duration (in minutes) of
a typical ID verification shift, duration (in years) of ID
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screening employment, and whether they use any type of
computerized aid in their ID screening procedures. This
last predictor was dummy-coded with 0 representing
"no" responses and 1 representing "yes" responses. Only
members of the professional sample who indicated that
they screen IDs as part of their current job (n = 403) were
included in these analyses1.
The first regression analysis examined hits. No predictors reached significance, but Years of employment marginally predicted match hit rate, b = − 0.003, SE = 0.002
t(402) = − 1.91, p = 0.06, 95% CI [− 0.005, 0.000]. Additional information can be found in Table 2.
The second regression analysis examined false alarms
to mismatches. Use of digital aids in ID screening positively predicted mismatch false alarms, b = 0.118,
SE = 0.037 t(402) = 3.22, p = 0.001, 95% CI [0.046, 0.190],
meaning that those professionals who use some kind of
computerized assistance when checking IDs on the job
were more likely to commit errors in our mismatch trials
(see Fig. 5). No other predictors reached significance.

Discussion
Once again, professional screening experience did not
improve identity-matching performance. Instead, Experiment 3 largely replicated the pattern of the two previous
studies: professionals commit the LPE at similar rates as
non-professionals. We more closely examined nuance
among facial reviewers in terms of training, typical identification matching duties, and digital additions (e.g.,
technological aids). Despite our attempts to more clearly
define the roles and relationship between professional
experience and the LPE, none of the following questionnaire components predicted improvements in overall
performance or mismatch LPE errors. To be fair, years
of experience suggested moderate prediction of match
performance, but that relationship was weak and perhaps
unreliable given the large sample size. We would need to
replicate this finding at a more stringent alpha level in
order to have more trust in its reliability.
The large sample size, on the other hand, did allow for
more variability in responses to the PITQ. Using a closeended and open-ended approach, participants provided
both presence/absence responses (e.g., did you experience any professional identity training?) as well as followup details (e.g., if yes, please explain). The quantitative
responses allowed for our inferential analysis above, but
the qualitative results may also be seen as informative
(for access to all responses, see OSF website listed below).
The only question that predicted mismatch errors was
the use of digital aids: professionals who reported using
them actually produced more mismatch errors than
those who did not (or non-professionals). This finding is
striking and worthy of additional consideration. Among
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Fig. 4 Average non-professional (left column) and professional (right column) match error rate, mismatch error rate, discriminability, and response
criterion at each level of prevalence and feedback from experiment 3. Error bars represent standard error of the mean (SE)
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Table 1 Demographic characteristics and survey responses from
security officers and bartenders in experiment 3

Total

Security

Bartender

317

202

b

SE b

β

Outcome: match hits

Ethnicity
Black/African-American

Table 2 Multiple regression results for relevant survey predictors
for committing hit and false alarm decisions in the ID matching
task used in experiment 3

26

24

Days of pre-employment ID-screening training

.00

.02

Years of ID-screening experience

.00

.00

− .01

− .10†

Hispanic/Latino

11

14

White/Caucasian

248

137

Minutes of ID-screening during typical work shift

.00

.00

10

Use of digital aids in screening (0 = No, 1 = Yes)

.03

.03

.02

.03

.03
− .01

Asian/Asian American/Pacific Islander

13

Other/chose not to respond

19

18

Outcome: mismatch false alarms

Mean (SD) age

41.74 (12.12)

36.94 (10.28)

Days of ID-screening training
Years of ID-screening experience

.00

.00

Female

123

109

Minutes of ID-screening during typical shift

.00

.00

Male

194

93

Use of digital aids in screening (0 = No, 1 = Yes)

.12

.04

Airport security

21

-

Border patrol officer

17

-

Police officer

120

-

Security guard

151

-

Other

7

-

Self-reported gender

Security field

− .03
.05

.02

.17*

*Indicates significant prediction p < .05
†

Indicates marginal prediction p < .06

Years working
<1

27

38

1 to 5

77

82

5 to 10

75

57

> 10

138

26

Mean (SD)

10.36 (8.83)

6.57 (6.67)

Mean (SD)

9.10 (2.29)

8.19 (2.20)

Screens IDs as current job duty

239

164

Mean (SD) years in this position

8.17 (8.06)

5.27 (5.18)

Mean (SD) minutes screening IDs in
work shift

212.06 (250.99) 252.56 (294.39)

Received training

83

52

Mean (SD) days training

8.75 (9.50)

2.18 (4.92)

Undergoes practice sessions

70

43

Receives feedback on ID screening

55

42

Person-to-photograph

217

140

Photograph-to-photograph

80

44

Video-to-person

70

24

Video-to-photograph

54

24

Person-to-person

64

21

Uses digital aids

35

27

Typical work shift length

ID screening media (select all that apply)

“SD” refers to standard deviation of the mean

those who thoroughly described these tools, reports
varied from tools for verifying authenticity of documents (e.g., watermarks, special inks, etc.) to automatic
facial matching against mugshot databases. We hesitate
to make claims about specific tools, as our experiment
was not devised to systematically test the effects of

Fig. 5 Average professional hit and false alarm rates among those
who reported normally using technology and those who do not in
experiment 3. Hits are derived from correct match trial responses, and
false alarms are derived from incorrect mismatch trial responses. Data
are collapsed across prevalence and feedback conditions. Error bars
represent standard error of the mean (SE)

specific pieces of software. Nonetheless, to the extent
that these digital aids are designed to improve identification-matching performance, our results suggest that
such resources could be more wisely invested in other
professional improvement approaches that benefit public safety. We explore possible mechanisms behind this
result and recommendations in the General Discussion.
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General discussion
Across three studies, we more thoroughly investigated
the role of professional experience in an ID screening
task comprised of different ratios of matched and mismatched face pairs. In Experiment 1, we replicated the
findings of Weatherford et al. (2020; Experiment 2) using
static stimuli and US driver licenses. We incorporated
feedback as a possible intervention: full feedback after
every trial, feedback only after error trials, or no feedback. In Experiment 2, we more strongly approximated
a real-world context by including video targets compared
with standardized US passports. We also incorporated
forms of visual feedback that were designed to reduce the
LPE in all samples (professional and otherwise) by disrupting attentional templates and criterion shifting that
drive the LPE. Further, we subdivided types of professional experience into two broad categories: bar security
and access security. Finally, Experiment 3 adopted the
same video target paradigm as Experiment 2 and introduced a response-contingent visual feedback condition
(as opposed to the visual repeat condition in E2). Most
importantly, we integrated a professional identity training questionnaire (PITQ) to more closely consider the
relationship between task performance and different facets of professional experience.
All three studies supported the same broad outcomes:
1) professionals suffer from LPE mismatch errors to
the same extent as non-trained members of the general public, 2) various forms of feedback and corrective
intervention do not reliably ameliorate the LPE, and 3)
self- reported differences in professional experience and
training do not confer the expertise necessary to combat
this problem, and may actually deteriorate performance
in some cases.
On the face of it, these results may seem disheartening
to both face researchers and security practitioners. However, closer analysis of these findings allows us to draw
two firm conclusions that warrant additional consideration. First, the failure to identify low prevalence fake IDs
represents a serious real-world problem that may compromise job performance and public safety. Second, the
nature of professional experience (Balsdon et al., 2018;
Towler et al., 2018, 2019) can offer key insights into the
important role of empirically informed training and mentorship to promote improvements in facial identification
performance that combat the LPE.
Fake IDs pose a serious security threat

To the extent that cognitive biases revealed by basic
research findings apply to the real world, the LPE represents a serious problem for ID verification. By all estimates, imposters rarely present fraudulent documents
at security checkpoints. If human screeners are not
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adequately prepared to detect imposters, then researchers need to partner with practitioners to address this
problem.
As an attempt to increase the efficacy of job performance, many professionals use digital aids. Several
currently adopted technologies credit earlier military
technology, such as the Biometric Automated Toolset
(BAT) and Handheld Interagency Identity Detection
Equipment (HIIDE; Xml et al., 2007). These tools assume
that routine checks of individuals need only involve the
human screener. However, under conditions when a
database of biometric information suggests additional
scrutiny, individuals under suspicion of criminal activity may be flagged on the basis of fingerprints, iris scans,
facial photographs, gait patterns, and/or biographical
information that matches established databases. In order
for these tools to be effective, human screeners must have
consistent access to the technology and databases must
be constantly updated (a standard that would be difficult
for any agency to meet).
Experiment 3 found that professionals who indicated
use of digital aids tended to commit more mismatch
errors than professionals who did not. These digital aids,
and the extent to which they are used, varied among
respondents. Therefore, we hesitate to draw firm conclusions about any specific tools used by professional security personnel.4 However, research elsewhere in applied
cognition has found that even pristinely accurate digital tools can disrupt user cognition. For example, use
of global positioning software can disrupt participants’
cognitive map formation, leading to poorer wayfinding later without such software compared to those who
learned topographies through experience alone (Ishikawa
et al., 2008; Minaei, 2014). Both this set of findings and
our own imply that domain-specific digital tools may aid
those using them in the moment, but may deleteriously
affect learning.
Future research should explore the magnitudes of
these tools’ various effects on identity matching ability.
For other visual search tasks, such as baggage screening (e.g., Huegli et al., 2020), automation might improve
screener performance. However, visually searching facial
cues is fundamentally different than visually searching object cues (e.g., Curby & Gauthier, 2010; McKone
et al., 2007). Computer aids may yield a higher successful detection rate for concrete aspects of the document
itself; however, human screeners still outperform many
algorithms on more nebulous visual cues associated with
identity (e.g., Phillips & O’Toole, 2014). Digital aids may
4

Tools described by respondents varied in function from document verification (i.e., determining whether the identification document is a legitimately
government-issued) to facial identity verification aids.
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focus attentional resources on identifying fraudulent
documents (e.g., black light scanners) at the expense of
identifying fraudulent identities. To the extent that an
ID is judged as an authentic document by the digital aid,
experiments could explore whether confirmation bias
(e.g., Rajsic et al., 2015) guides visual search by attenuating goal-directed attention after the first goal is satisfied (see also, multiple target search satisfaction; Adamo
et al., 2019; Biggs & Mitroff, 2014; Cain & Mitroff, 2013;
Thornton & Gilden, 2007). Although criterion shifting is
a well-known source of LPE errors in facial comparison
tasks, these real-world possibilities may also lend support
to additional errors driven by early search termination.
One justifiable recruiting expense may be to solicit
assistance from individuals with superior facial recognition skills (e.g., super-recognizers; SRs; Davis et al., 2016;
Ramon et al., 2019a, 2019b; Russell et al., 2009). Studies show that super recognizers may not be fully aware
of their skills (i.e., limited metacognitive awareness; e.g.,
Bate & Dudfield, 2019) and fail to adequately calibrate
their confidence in response to face-matching decisions
(e.g., Gettleman et al., 2020; Ramon et al., 2019a). Even
more challenging, SRs might not take interest in security
screening, regardless of their enhanced abilities. Therefore, recruiting identity screeners in professional circles
may be problematic. Nonetheless, working with super
recognizers offers a potentially promising way forward,
as these individuals are more successful at recognizing
faces despite common sources of within-person variability such as age gaps, day-to-day changes in facial hair
or makeup, and suboptimal viewing conditions (Bate,
Frowd, et al., 2019b; Ramon et al., 2019a; Stacchi et al.,
2020; although SRs still suffer from Own Race Bias; Bate,
Bennetts, et al., 2019a). These challenges to face matching are typical for professional screeners, given that many
identification documents (e.g., US Passports) are valid for
up to ten years, during which time any bearer of an ID
would undergo some substantive visual changes. To the
extent that these types of skills can be trained, the most
advantageous role for SRs might be to inform facial comparison training.
Feedback contributes to low prevalence errors

As a general pattern, our data (see also, Papesh et al.,
2018) do not support the use of feedback as an intervention to combat the LPE. When match and mismatch trials were imbalanced, participants’ criterion shifted with
explicit feedback (see Experiment 3 data for strongest
evidence of the crossover interaction). In a sense, this
finding is ideal because trial-by-trial feedback would be
impossible in real-world security settings. If the “ground
truth” were known about the accuracy of a human
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screener’s decision, there would be no need for the
human screener.
Interestingly, this pattern is not unique to ID matching tasks. Coining the term Prevalence-Induced Concept
Change (PICC), Levari et al. (2018) reported data that
might shed light on the theoretical mechanisms driving
the differences. PICC posits that low prevalence prompts
observers use their own implicit feedback (on the basis of
their own imbalanced responding) to expand the boundaries of an ambiguous concept (e.g., color labels across a
spectrum, facial expressions that signal threat) by shifting
their criterion to consider more stimuli as exemplars of
an infrequent category. For instance, after establishing a
balanced prevalence between colored dots ranging from
“mostly blue” to “mostly purple,” participants were more
likely to miscategorize colors in the purple range as blue
when blue stimuli became infrequent. If training regimens could successfully establish and maintain an expectation for balanced prevalence rates between authentic
and fake IDs (or integrate high-prevalence bursts, e.g.,
Papesh et al., 2018), human screeners might prefer committing a false negative (i.e., rejecting an authentic ID)
over a false positive (i.e., accepting a fake ID). However,
more research would need to test this possibility before
making training recommendations.
Training to combat this problem needs to be intentional
and research‑informed

As corroborated by our PITQ findings, many employers
invest substantial resources to improve facial reviewers’ performance on their routine screening tasks. While
research-informed training is showing early success for
other professional search domains within airport security (Biggs et al., 2018; e.g., Biggs & Mitroff, 2019; Swann
et al., 2019), findings within facial comparison screening
remain mixed (e.g., Towler et al., 2019). Outside of training that focuses on authenticating documents, which may
lead to confirmation bias issues, any successful training
regimen must meaningfully nurture a screener’s ability to differentiate within-person variability under circumstances when someone presents a genuine ID from
between-person variability when someone presents an
imposter ID. In order for training and on-the-job experience to promote facial comparison expertise (White
et al., 2015), the training needs to include (a) images with
facial variability (e.g., Kramer & Ritchie, 2016; Matthews
& Mondloch, 2018; Menon et al., 2015a) such as the
Good, the Bad, and the Ugly facial training set (Phillips
et al., 2012), (b) guided mentorship (see FISWG, 2011 criteria for facial examiners), and (c) an emphasis on accuracy over speed.
Relatedly, research needs to more strongly examine
how training and professional experience transfer to job
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performance. Despite extensive previous experience with
imbalanced ratios of authentic to fraudulent ID cards, our
professionals did not apply of their knowledge of realworld base rates to the experimental task (which would
have otherwise made their performance worse than nonprofessionals). One possibility is that professionals may
compartmentalize the experimental/training scenario as
related, but distinct, from the actual screening task itself.
If that lack of transfer can account for our findings, future
research should explore how training performance actually predicts real-world performance before making specific recommendations.
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Conclusions
To conclude, our results reveal that professionals and
non-professionals do not differ in their ID matching abilities. When professionals make errors, it is likely due to
limited metacognitive awareness of their error rates and
their possible reliance upon digital aids, which is especially pronounced when we only examine low prevalence
conditions. Future research should explore the extent
to which professional screeners may merely invest their
resources to verifying the authenticity of the document
itself rather than the identity, and how they calibrate their
confidence in their identity matching decisions.
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Appendix
Professional Identity Training Questionnaire (PITQ)
1. Please select your gender from the following options.
Male
Female
Non-Binary
Decline to Answer
2. What is your race/ethnicity? Please check all that apply.
American Indian or Alaskan Native
Asian
Black or African American
Hispanic or Latino
Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander
White
Other
Decline to Answer
3. If Other, please specify:
4. What is your age?
5. Select a category that best fits your occupation. (If Unemployed is selected, skip to question
12)
Administration and Business Management
Education and Training
Finance
Health Care and Social Services
Hospitality and Tourism
Sales and Retail Services
Security Personnel and Law Enforcement
Self-employed
Transportation and Public Safety

Other
Unemployed
6. If Other, please specify:
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7. How many hours do you work on a normal day?
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
greater than 12
8. If greater than 12, please type number of hours:
9. How many years have you been employed in your current occupation?
less than 1
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
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15
16
17
18
19
20
greater than 20
10. If less than 1, please type number of months.
11. If greater than 20, please list number of years.
12. Is (Has) verifying a person's identification ever been part of your employment duties? (If No
is selected, skip to end of survey)
Yes
No
13. If yes, please explain:
14. Has your prior matching or verification experience ever been a pre-employment screening
question?
Yes
No
15. If yes, please explain:
16. How many years have/did you performed identity matching or verification as part of your
job?
less than 1
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
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12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
greater than 20
17. If less than 1 year, please list in number of months.
18. If greater than 20 years, please type number of years.
19. On a typical work day, how much of your time is/was dedicated to identity matching or
verification?
hours _____________________________________________
minutes ________________________________________________

20. Have you ever had any formal identity matching or verification training as part of your
employment?
Yes
No
21. If yes, please explain:
22. How many days was the training?

Less than 1
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
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Less than 1
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

26
27
28
29
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23. If greater than 30 days, please describe:
24. Do/Did you participate in any identity matching or verification practice sessions for your
job?

o Yes
o No

25. If yes, please explain:
26. Do/Did you receive any feedback on your identity matching or verification accuracy?

o Yes
o No

27. If yes, please explain:
28. Do you think that regular identity matching or verification practice with feedback would be
beneficial to employee job performance?

o Yes
o No

29. If yes, please explain:
30. When performing identity matching or verification, how do/did you verify the identity of a
person? Please check all that apply.

 ڨperson to photo ID
 ڨphoto to photo ID
 ڨvideo footage to person
 ڨvideo footage to photo ID
 ڨperson to person
31. Do/Did you utilize any digital facial recognition technology?
o Yes
o No

32. If yes, please explain:
33. Did you receive any special training to operate this technology?

o Yes
o No

34. If yes, please explain:
Abbreviations
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